پایان نامه با کلید واژه های روابط بین الملل، باراک اوباما

دانلود پایان نامه ارشد

Research service, 2013, Washington. DC.
19. Kim Richard? Nossal, 1989. International sanction as International Punishment, International organization Vol, 43, No 2.
20. Kenneth, waltz, Man, the state and wav, Columbia university press, 1954.
21. Kenneth walthz, Man’ the state and war, Columbia university press, 1954, P, 263.
22. Kave. L. Afrasibi, Iran’s nuclear program: Debation facts versus fictions, Book swge, LLc, 2006, P.19.
23. Kenneth walthz, Man’ the state and war, Columbia university press, 1954, P, 263.
24. Kenneth waltz, theory of International politics, New York: Addison Wesley publishing company, 1954, P. 107.
25. Linzer, Dafina, Past Arguments do square with current Iran policy, washinagton post, 26 Mavch 2011.
26. Mearsheimer, J/ohn. J, “the Flse preomise of International Institutions International security, vol. 19/ NO3 winter 1994 /95, PP. 10-120.
27. Nair,MC,th law of traties, oxford, 1961, P.45
28. Pawlak, Justyna, and Insight: How European courts are dismantling sanctions on Iran. REUTERS, 15 July 2013.
29. Pllak, Kenneth and Ray takeyth taking on Tehran foreign Affairs (March/April/2005)
30. Rittberger, v, ed (2004), German Foregin policy since unification Manchester, YK, Manchester university press.
31. Ronald, w, the history of the British petroleum company. Combidge publication, 1982, P454.
32. Saeidnia, Soodabeh, consequences of International sanctions on Irabian scientists and the Basis of science, Hepattis Monthly 2013, September: 13.
33. Skinner, Q uentin, visions of politics, volum, 1 Cambridge, Cambridge university press, 2002, P24.
سایت های اینترنتی
سخنان باراک اوباما در کنفرانس سالانه مرکز سابان، 7 دسامبر 2013.
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/12.
34. سخنان جان کری وزیر خارجه آمریکا در مجلس نمایندگان آمریکا، 10 دسامبر 2013.
http://www.irannuc.ir/sites/default/files/field/attache

http://IIpdigitaltest.usembassy.gov/st/persian/2013/10
http://www.irannuc.ir
http://eeas.europa.eu/sfsp/sanctions/docs/measures-en.Pdf
35. رضازاده، میثم، تناقض های «برنامه اقدام مشترک» و هزینه های آن برای ایران. پایگاه تحلیلی، تبیینی برهان، 1392.
http://borhan.ir/site/fullstory/?Id=6104
36. زنگنه، حمید، جستجوی همکاری بین الملل در میان نظریه های روابط بین الملل.
http://vista.ir/article/263207,1392
www.iaea.org

پیوست ها و ضمائم

Geneva, 24 November 2013
Joint Plan of Action
Preamble
The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-bystep process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme.
There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including, among other things, addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Council’s consideration of this matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran
will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues ofconcern.
Elements of a first step
The first step would be time-bound, with a duration of 6 months, and renewable by mutual consent, during which all parties will work to maintain a constructive atmosphere for negotiations in good faith.
Iran would undertake the following voluntary measures:
• From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide
for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%.
No reconversion line.
• Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months. 2
• Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel
Enrichment Plant1
, Fordow2
, or the Arak reactor3
, designated by the IAEA as IR-40.
• Beginning when the line for conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% to UO2 is ready, Iran
has decided to convert to oxide UF6 newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period, as provided in the operational schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA.
• No new locations for the enrichment.
• Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its current enrichment R&D
practices, which are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.
• No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.
• Enhanced monitoring:
o Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iran’s plans
for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a
description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in specified
nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on
source material. This information would be provided within three months of the
adoption of these measures.
o Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as
the IR-40, to the IAEA.
o Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the
reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.
o Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of
Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical
Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to
offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.
IAEA inspector managed access to:
centrifuge assembly workshops4
centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and, uranium mines and mills.
Namely, during the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF6 into the centrifuges installed but not enriching uranium. Not install
additional centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of
the same type.
At Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not increase enrichment capacity. Not
feed UF6 into the other 12 cascades, which would remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections between cascades.
Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.
Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the
reactor or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor
or install remaining components.
Consistent with its plans, Iran’s centrifuge production during the 6 months will be dedicated to replace damaged machines.3
In return, the E3/EU+3 would undertake the following voluntary measures:
• Pause efforts to further reduce Iran’s crude oil sales, enabling Iran’s current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed
amount of revenue held abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services.
• Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on:
o Iran’s petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services.5

o Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services.
• Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran’s auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated services.
• License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil
aviation and associated services. License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran as well as associated services.6
• No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions.
• No new EU nuclear-related sanctions.
• The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the
Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.
• Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran’s domestic needs using
Iranian oil revenues held abroad. Humanitarian trade would be defined as transactions
involving food and agricultural products, medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses
incurred abroad. This channel would involve specified foreign banks and non-designated
Iranian banks to be defined when establishing the channel.
This channel could also enable:
transactions required to pay Iran’s UN obligations; and,
direct tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students
studying abroad, up to an agreed amount for the six month period.
Increase the EU authorisation thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed amount.
“Sanctions on associated services” means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to the
underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to

پایان نامه
Previous Entries پایان نامه با کلید واژه های حقوق بین الملل، سیاست خارجی، وزارت امور خارجه، توافق ژنو Next Entries پایان نامه ارشد درباره سیاست خارجی، واقع گرایی، نوواقع گرایی، نظام بین الملل