center in this play; the space of patchwork is a free space that follows its own particular values totally different from the unified, harmonious pattern. The place that she sits in is dark, empty and gloomy and this is the version of the nomadic space, wherein the body of nomad is indexed to the gloomy place. It’s body that moves in the intensities of gloomy atmosphere:
Stage in darkness but for MOUTH, upstage audience right, about 8 feet above stage level, faintly lit from close-up and below, rest of face in shadow. Invisible microphone. AUDITOR, downstage audience left, tall standing figure, sex undeterminable, enveloped from head to foot in loose black djellaba, with hood, fully faintly lit, standing on invisible podium about 4 feet high shown by attitude alone to be facing diagonally across stage intent on MOUTH, dead still throughout but for four brief movements where indicated. See Note.
As house lights down MOUTH`S voice unintelligible behind curtain. House lights out. Voice continues unintelligible behind curtain, l0 seconds. With rise of curtain ad-libbing from text as required leading when curtain fully up and attention sufficient into (367).
The convergence of the outside and nomad results in the destruction of subject and no trace of her deserted identity “I”. She is trying to have identity but that is the useless journey for a nomad who belongs to nothing.
The desire in striated space and smooth space circulates differently. Although the former takes desire in oedipal form, the latter takes desire in anti-oedipal and apersonal form. This depersonalized form of desire moves against the familiar direction of the differentiated, meaning-centered and familial Freudian Oedipality which Deleuze and Guattari call “sick desire” (Anti-Oedipus 334). The sickness of this desire is its very oedipality in their views, when desire is captured and patterned by a social machine. This limiting act practiced on desire brings it under severe discipline in a way that the circulation of its energetic forces is channeled toward a striated, socially accepted direction. The oedipal is the acknowledgment of man, who is the subject, the model point of being. Deleuze tries to negate the terrain of origin, self and identity in order to flow and pass through other than man. He also calls for an anti-oedipal revolution that aims at freeing desire from capitalist axiomatic. Capitalist society pushes personal motivation to be free but by its rules and legislations. On the other hand, Deleuze’s anti-oedipal trajectory is releasing desire from Freudian frets of the familial incestuous origin. The ego psychology functions like a totalitarian ideology that seeks stability and for this it needs to order things, to impose organization to bring about homogeneity. The prime task is thus to kill the circulation of desire as it is proven to be the enemy of organization. The process of schizophrenizing is a pivotal course BWO undertakes. Everything that is related to Oedipus is supposed to be under the domain of social and political rules while the process of schizophrenization is known as the plane of personal “schizo analysis is the negative of Capitalist formation… destroy, destroy Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, a complete curettage” (Anti- Oedipus 311). This process can be traced in woman’s life when she does belong to nowhere so she has potential to be grouped as a nomad. In fact, she is vacillating between the world of nothingness and her loneliness and this road fails to reach any destination.
3.3 Negation of Ego- Not I
As it is clearly realized, Mouth narrates the story of an ambiguous ‘character’. In Not I, Mouth continually refers to “she” ( 376). This fictional figure is the closest the play gets to producing a fully formed subject and so Mouth rejects that She is its own subjectivity: “what? .. who? .. no! .. she!” (377).Before endeavoring to understand the nature of She, it is appropriate to primarily address the problem of pronouns that the play presents, beginning with its title. The phrase ‘not I’ can be read in a number of ways, two of which are as follows: She is not I; or equally, Mouth is not I. In the case of the former, Mouth would become the I of the play and She would be I’s (Mouth’s) Other. However, this seems an insufficient assumption, as Mouth never once uses the pronoun I throughout the play itself and, moreover, Beckett insists on Mouth’s “vehement refusal to relinquish third person” (375). This can only mean that Mouth is not ‘I’. As such, whatever Mouth is, it is characterized by the fact that it is categorically not a subject. However, this is not to say that She is I, either. Indeed, the simple pronouns used here would contradict such a conclusion, as – grammatically speaking, at least – the pronoun ‘she’ and the pronoun ‘I’ are distinctly different in person.
The complication here is that if She is not ‘I’ and Mouth is not I, then the title requires a third interpretation. A possible alternative, for example, may be that: There is not I; or, more specifically, there is not (an) I. If one were to accept this reading as a possibility, then it becomes evident that what the I of the title refers to is the lack thereof, the fact that there is no I at all. ‘Not I’, therefore, is the simple suggestion that this is a play without a subject. But, in order to understand this desubjectification fully, it is important to qualify what She is, or further, what She is not.
As stated formerly, She is the closest the play comes to subjectivity. Yet, this subject is never fully made manifest. In fact, Beckett’s characters never achieve stability. Oftentimes they are barely present at all. This is because She simultaneously functions as both the I and the Other, a an inclusionary state that disallows exclusive subjectification. It is stated, for example, that: “words were coming … a voice she did not recognize” (379). As soon as She starts to speak, She is defamiliarised from the voice of the I. In other words, the I speaks in a voice that She perceives as Other. In order to hear it back, She hears it back as an Other also.
If She is both speaker and listener, She aligns herself with both the speaking subject and the listening Other at the same time. Yet, She acknowledges that this voice was “none other … than her own” (379). As in, the Other of her voice is her own and ‘none other’. Here, in order to have this voice, She must own the Other embodied in it. As such, Beckett is placing Otherness into the voice of the I who owns it. He accentuates the complicity of the Other and the I, exemplifying the way in which this binary operates through the language of She. She is at times deluded that the voice “was not hers at all” (379). She does not ignore the fact that this voice is “hers alone … her voice alone”, and yet even then, She cannot escape the undercurrent of “this other awful thought” (379). The other awful thought, in this instance, is the enduring presence of the Other in ‘She’’s attempt at being an I. Thus, the words of She are exhausted because they are spoken through the foreign voice of the Other, which “give them the only reality to which they can lay claim” (Deleuze, 7).
For the absent I, again, it is necessary here to return to the plays’ titles, Not I, perpetuates the notion of desubjectification; it categorises itself as a play without subjectivity. This is made painstakingly evident in the desubjectification of She, as well as Mouth’s refusal to adopt the I. As such, both Mouth and She are presences without subjectivity, creating a play that revolves around the annihilation of the I. In fact, the subject is not important, there is none, The activity of speaking is thus a process of attempting to formulate a new voice, an authentic pronoun, which remains all the while relentlessly elusive. Similar to Deleuzean Images, Mouth is a desubjectified presences that create an experience, which is ever unthinkable, because it is an experience that remains objective, beyond the frontiers that subjectivity inevitably enforces.
For Deleuze, every literary work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically “style, in a great writer, is always a style of life too, not anything at all personal, but inventing a possibility of life, a way of existing” (Deleuze89). For what Anti-Oedipus terms schizophrenia as a process is nothing other than what A Thousand Plateaus terms the process of life as a nonorganic and impersonal power. As Deleuze mentioned
No one has been able to pose the problem of language except to the extent that linguists and logicians have eliminated meaning; and the highest power of language was discovered only when the work was viewed as a machine, producing certain effects, amenable to a certain use. The idea that meaning is nothing other than use becomes a principle only if we have at our disposal immanent criteria capable of determining legitimate uses, as opposed to illegitimate uses that would refer use to supposed meaning and restore a kind of transcendence analysis termed transcendental is precisely the determination of these immanent criteria (Deleuze 89).
In fact the claim that meaning is valid only if one begins with elements that in themselves are devoid of any signification. Modern literature had tended to pose this question in terms of the problem of a world in fragments, a world deprived of its unity, reduced to crumbs and chaos. We live in an age that no longer thinks in terms of a primordial unity or logos we have lost or a subjectivity it is only when objective contents and subjective forms have collapsed and given way to a world of fragments, to a chaotic and multiple impersonal reality that the work of art assumes its full meaning. As a matter of fact, Deleuze as a modern philosopher has followed the way of other philosophers in that era that pave the way of the death for God, the destruction of the world,