t was very clear about when asked: “How could you think of such a thing! No, no, not at all – it wasn’t that at all” (Beckett 18). It seems more likely that she has suffered some kind of collapse, possibly even her death, while “wandering in a field … looking aimlessly for cowslips” (78). Her initial reaction to the paralyzing event is to assume she is being punished by God, but she finds she is not suffering; she feels no pain, as in life she felt no pleasure. She cannot think why she might be being punished but accepts that God does not need a “particular reason” for what He does. She thinks she has something to tell though doesn’t know what yet believes if she goes over the events of her life for long enough she will stumble upon that thing for which she needs to seek forgiveness. In addition to the continued buzzing in her skull there is now a light of varying intensity tormenting her. As in many of Beckett’s works there is a cyclical nature fading in and out to similar expressions suggesting this is a snapshot of a much larger event. The title comes from the character’s repeated insistence that the events she describes or alludes to did not happen to her.
During the 15 years following the war, Beckett produced four major full-length stage plays: En attendant Godot ( 1948–1949; Waiting for Godot), Fin de partie (1955–1957; Endgame) , Krapp’s Last Tape (1958), and Happy Days (1961). These plays- which are often considered, rightly or wrongly, to have been instrumental in the so-called “Theater of the absurd”- deal in a very bleakly humorous way with themes similar to those of the roughly contemporary existentialist thinkers. Though many of the themes are similar, Beckett had little affinity with existentialism as a whole. Broadly speaking, the plays deal with the subject of despair and the will to survive in spite of that despair, in the face of an uncomprehending and incomprehensible world. Beckett’s outstanding achievements in prose during the period were the three novels Molly (1951), Malone meurt (1951; Malone Dies) and L’innommable (1953: The Unnamable). In these novels—sometimes referred to as a “trilogy”, though this is against the author’s own explicit wishes—the prose becomes increasingly bare and stripped down. Despite the widely held view that Beckett’s work, as exemplified by the novels of this period, is essentially pessimistic. After these three novels, Beckett struggled for many years to produce a sustained work of prose, a struggle evidenced by the brief “stories” later collected as Texts for Nothing. In the late 1950s, however, he created one of his most radical prose works, Comment c’est (1961; How It Is).
In reading Beckett’s three plays (Krapp’s last tape, Not I, and Happy Days) what comes into focus is the representation of a process of becoming, affect of characters who repressed in modern society. Although the main issue in these plays revolves around absurdity in critical studies, a new study would bring how absurdity reflected in a process of becoming for Krapp and other characters. They keep coming back to themselves no matter how chokingly violent the world is. Despite loneliness, despair, and isolation they got accustomed to survive under the gloomy atmosphere of modern society exemplified in the character of Krapp who tries to find himself among tapes. The language used in these plays is fragmented, chaotic and endless that mocks the structured, highly stylized and codified language of traditional theater; The language that escapes any specific clear one dimensional interpretation. Such notions practiced in Beckett’s plays, have been well expressed, expanded, and theorized by Gilles Deleuze’s postulates in France, which might be another proof for the uniqueness and universality of such issues.
Gilles Deleuze ( 18 January 1925 – 4 November 1995) is a French philosopher who, from the early 1960s until his death, wrote influentially on philosophy, literature, film and fine art. His most popular works were the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Anti-Oedipus (1972) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980). His metaphysical treatise Difference and Repetition (1968) is considered by many scholars to be his magnum opus. Deleuze’s works fall into two groups: on one hand, monographs interpreting the work of other philosophers (Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, Bergson, Foucault) and artists (Proust, Kafka, Francis Bacon); on the other, eclectic philosophical tomes organized by concept (e.g., difference, sense, events, schizophrenia, cinema, philosophy). Regardless of topic, however, Deleuze consistently develops variations on similar ideas.
Deleuze’s main philosophical project in the works he wrote prior to his collaborations with Guattari can be boldly summarized as an inversion of the traditional metaphysical relationship between identity and difference. Deleuze claims that all identities are effects of difference. Identities are neither logically nor metaphysically prior to difference, Deleuze argues, “given that there exist differences of nature between things of the same genus” ( Anti-Oedipus 16).That is, not only are no two things ever the same, the categories we use to identify individuals in the first place derive from differences. Difference, in other words, goes all the way down. To confront reality honestly, Deleuze argues, we must grasp beings exactly as they are, and concepts of identity (forms, categories, resemblances, unities of apperception, predicates, etc.) fail to attain what he calls “difference in itself.” “If philosophy has a positive and direct relation to things, it is only insofar as philosophy claims to grasp the thing itself, according to what it is, in its difference from everything it is not, in other words, in its internal difference” (Anti-Oedipus 69).
Moreover, Deleuze claims that being is univocal, i.e., that all of its senses are affirmed in one voice. Deleuze adapts the doctrine of univocity to claim that being is, univocally, difference. “With univocity, however, it is not the differences which are and must be: it is being which is Difference, in the sense that it is said of difference. Moreover, it is not we who are univocal in a Being which is not; it is we and our individuality which remains equivocal in and for a univocal Being”(67) For Deleuze, there is no one substance, only an always-differentiating process, an origami cosmos, always folding, unfolding, refolding. Deleuze summarizes this ontology in the paradoxical formula “pluralism= monism”(Anti-Oedipus 68).
Difference and Repetition is Deleuze’s most sustained and systematic attempt to work out the details of such a metaphysics, but his other works develop similar ideas. In Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962), for example, reality is a play of forces; in Anti Oedipus (1972), a “body without organs”; in What Is Philosophy? (1991), a “plane of immanence “ or “chaosmos”(90).
1.2 Statement of the Problem
There would be no way one can merely claim that Beckett had Deleuze in mind while writing his three pieces, Krapp’s Last Tape, Not I, and Endgame. However, while reading these plays, as a researcher, one may come across the notion of process of becoming, what Deleuze frequently concentrates on in his revolutionizing theories. The process of becoming other than yourself and coming into the light of the new world in which there is no place for humanity to be there. Therefore, the researcher aims to examine the main characters in the mentioned works- Krapp, Ham, Clov, and the woman’s mouth- carefully to see if they can be positioned in such a process. Furthermore, she needs to make sure that she would not limit herself to finding traces of Deleuze’s becoming process in Becket’s male and female figures; rather it is necessary to expand the whole theory to other characters and events to examine the applicability of Deleuze’s theory to Becket’s theater. In the same way, the significance of the male and female figures’ function in these works should not be degraded as they are not excluded from Becket’s or Deleuze’s. On the contrary, they are to be appreciated in the newly born world of becoming.
One of the main issues dealt with in this study is the importance of both Becket’s and Deleuze’s language that escapes any attempt for fixed one-dimensional meaning. Such writings always carry the risk of being over read, or blocking the examiner in their complexities. Thus, although Becket’s fragmented, chaotic and endless texts that mocks the structured, highly stylized and codified language is artistically used in all three aforementioned plays, the researcher should patiently scrutinize the purpose behind it to see if it can be brought in line with what Deleuze meant by becoming and effect. Another notion equally abstract and important, is the issue of humanity that should be treated just as emphatically of the becoming since Deleuze spends an article-space defining the process of not censoring the human and writing about it. Equally significant for Becket, human becoming other things is the main source of suffering as well as liberated in Krapp’s Last Tape, Not I and Endgame. Such delicacy should be taken into consideration in applying Deleuze’s notion of becoming to Becket’s disembodiment of his characters to prevent any possible over reading. In conclusion, to have a thoroughly Deleuzean study of Samuel Becket’s Krapp’s Last Tape, Not I, and Endgame, the researcher needs to pursue a complicated procedure of finding and analyzing the coordinated elements in both literary and critical domains chosen in this research.
1.3 Significance of the Problem
The objective of this research is to examine Beckett’s three plays Krapp’s Last Tape, Not I and Endgame in the vein of Deleuzean projects of becoming and affect. Therefore, the researcher wishes to demonstrate how Deleuze’s notion of becoming in the process of reconstructing the newly born world is applicable to Becket’s three main