tiny little thing . . . before its
time . . . in a god for- . . . what?. . girl?. . yes . . . tiny little girl . . . into this . .
. out into this . . . before her time . . . godforsaken hole called . . . called . . .
no matter . . . parents unknown . . . unheard of . . .
Mouth refuses, for example, the order of identity or subjectival interpellation: “what? . . who? . . no! . . she! . . (377).” This explicit refusal of identity between the speaking voice and the subject of the enunciation is not the only expression of such; fractures in the subject occur throughout the text. For example: “but the brain still . . . still sufficiently . . oh very much so! . . at this stage . . . in control . . . under control” (378). Here there is a fracture between the sense of the brain as the seat of control and as the object of control, a fracture that is embedded in certain difficulties of the language itself and of everyday forms of expression. The hesitation between the options of the brain being in control or under control, and the knotty philosophical and theological problems that these very normal expressions imply, reveals further the problem around the relationship between language and the subject, a problem that is inseparable from the collective plane of enunciation. Both expressions have a prior virtual existence on that plane and there is no justification for choosing one over the other; yet each implies a very different understanding of human being. The question of who or what is in control, and the question of the identity or otherwise of enunciation and subject are clearly closely related; and if that identity is being explicitly refused, then who or what is the agent of refusing?
It would be too simple to make a straightforward claim for the autonomy of language itself; language is, after all the product of collective practice, it does not spring into the world fully formed. However, language and enunciation clearly stand apart from the speaker:
and now this stream . . . not catching the half of it . . . not the quarter . . . no
idea . . . what she was saying . . . imagine! . . no idea what she was saying!
. . till she began trying to . . . delude herself . . . it was not hers at all . . . not
her voice at all . . . (379).
The stream of enunciation is an event, a line of flight that the speaker is propelled along beyond ‘her’ control, that she is incapable of deciphering; the signified meaning is not where the significance of this event lies. It lies rather in the event itself. It is an infection of chaos that comes neither from inside nor outside. It certainly does not have its source in her subjectivity, yet it comes from the mouth, an orifice that marks the permeability of the subject, the uncertainty of the border between inside and outside – or between order and chaos. While language is an element of the individual, it is also not that individual or the order of a subject; it has its basis for existence in the chaotic plane of collective enunciation. Even while it is not strictly autonomous, it is not exactly under the control of the individual who speaks either, and it does not have its origin in her; therefore it is inside and outside and, through the deterritorialising force of this both-and, when it is revealed through a non-signifying and deterritorialising disruption of the subject, it produces a confrontation with the world itself. The opening onto the chaos of language provides an opening onto the unassimilable world – not I – that language is an element of, even as it is an element of the human individual.
Not I, resulting, addresses a refusal of identification with the recognizable subject and the unified order of the self and as such presents the audience with an encounter with the real of language, with the chaos of language and with the chaos of the other with which they are inscribed. The text produces openings onto the chaos of the world of the real beyond the ordering dominance of the signifier; the text traces different but clearly related lines of flight through chaos that may transform the relationship of the individual with that which lies beyond it. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari refer to life’s production of ‘lines of flight’, where mutations and differences produce not just the progression of history but disruptions, breaks, new beginnings and ‘monstrous’ births. This is also the event: not another moment within time, but something that allows time to take off on a new path. In fact, the human becomes more than itself, or expands to its highest power, not by affirming its humanity, nor by returning to animal state, but by becoming-hybrid with what is not itself. This creates ‘lines of flight’; from life itself we imagine all the becomings of life, using the human power of imagination to overcome the human.
3.1.1 Regimes of Signs
To keep in mind Deleuzean postulates attention must be drawn to his celebrated theory of regime of signs. The list that comes into consideration is limited. Based on Deleuze and Guattari’s idea, A Thousand Plateaus, all semiotics are mixed and not only combine with various forms of content but also combine different regimes of signs, “presignifying elements are always active in the signifying regime; countersignifying element are always present and at work within it; and postsignifying elements are already there”( A Thousand Plateaus 119). The semiotics and their mixture may appear in a history of confrontation and intermingling of peoples, but also in languages in which there are several competing functions. Doubtless, every regime of signs effectuates the condition of possibility of language and utilizes language elements, but that is all. As Foucault clearly shows, regimes of signs are only function of existence of language that sometimes span a number of languages and are sometimes distributed within a single language (Anti-Oedipus 367-378).
As mentioned above, Deleuze and Guattari discuss regimes of signs thoroughly. The main points extract to be followed:
A certain number of semiotics displaying very diverse characteristics. The presigni-fying semiotics, in which the “overcoding” marking the privileged status of language operates diffusel: enunciation is collective, statements themselves are polyvocal, and substances of expression are multiple; relative deterritorialization is determined by the confrontation between the territorialities and segmentary lineages that ward off the State apparatus. The signifying semiotic: overcoding is fully effectuated by the signifier, and by the State apparatus that emits it; there is uniformity of enunciation, unification of the substance of expression, and control over statements in a regime of circularity; relative deterritorialization is taken as far as it can go by a redundant and perpetual referral from sign to sign ( A Thousand Plateaus 135).
According to this explanation, the text can finally convey the meaning and this is a kind of representation of ordinary language that is supposed to transfer the meaning to the reader or listener. In fact, this group of signs cannot include Beckett’s use of language, for as far as we know he negates the meaning in literary texts through literature. On the other hand, two other signs according to Deleuze and Guattari’s view have different characteristics that can be taken into consideration:
The countersign-nifying semiotics: here, overcoding is assured by the number as form of expression or enunciation, and by the War Machine upon which it depends; deterritorialization follows a line of active destruction or abolition. The postsignifying semiotics, in which overcoding is assured by the redundancy of consciousness; a subjectification of enunciation occurs on a passional line that makes the organization of power immanent and raises deterritorialization to the absolute, although in a way that is still negative( A Thousand Plateaus 135).
In Not I these two signifying systems are operative in a way to demonstrate that there is no final meaning in. Consequently, mouth takes the place of the body which is hidden and the responsibility is given to mouth to explain everything, by which she manifests herself through voice. But what is heard in sound is the nonbody, just as what is seen in the play are words. The mouth has become the body of the woman, just as the mouth was the body of the signifier. It is now the body, the most deterritorialized of things. As the play proceeds the woman is talking through the mouth but I would say that it is not talking, it is just the chain of words which come from unconscious part of her mind. These words don’t make sense; In fact, you, as a reader don’t get any specific meaning through these words because they are not even a sentence; they are just words next to each other that you can see here
out . . . into this world . . . this world . . . tiny little thing . . . before its time . . . in a god for– . . . what? . . girl? . . yes . . . tiny little girl . . . into this . . . out into this . . . before her time . . . godforsaken hole called . . . called . . . no matter . . . parents unknown . . . unheard of . . . he having vanished . . . thin air . . . no sooner buttoned up his breeches . . . she similarly . . . eight months later . . . almost to the tick . . . so no love . . . spared that . . . no love such as normally vented on the . . . speechless infant . . . in the home (67).
As mentioned above, all through these assertions mind is talking without any control and meaning. This mouth relates a tale of woe in somewhat fragmented and disjointed sentences talking about past traumas and a very empty and painful life. The images include a flicker of light, the dull buzzing and roaring in her skull, a moving mouth, and a field in April, at first light but then entirely dark. These repeated images, however, each drawn to the same conclusion- a rebirth of sorts of nothingness. The