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Results from DEAP Version 2.1

Instruction file = eg1-ins.txt
Data file = eg1-dta.txt

Input orientated DEA

Scale assumption: CRS

Slacks calculated using multi-stage method

EFFICIENCY SUMMARY:

firm te
1 1.000
2 0.924
3 1.000
4 0.741
5 1.000
6 1.000
7 1.000
8 1.000
9 0.857
10 0.367
11 1.000
12 1.000
13 0.334
14 0.945
15 0.558
16 0.607
17 0.603
18 0.780
19 0.679
20 0.612
21 1.000
22 0.900
23 0.700
24 1.000
25 1.000
26 1.000
27 1.000
28 1.000

mean 0.843

Results from DEAP Version 2.1

Instruction file = eg1-ins.txt
Data file = eg1-dta.txt

Input orientated DEA

Scale assumption: VRS

Slacks calculated using multi-stage method

EFFICIENCY SUMMARY:

firm crste vrste scale

1 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
2 0.924 1.000 0.924 drs
3 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
4 0.741 1.000 0.741 drs
5 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
6 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
7 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
8 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
9 0.857 1.000 0.857 drs
10 0.367 0.590 0.622 drs
11 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
12 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
13 0.334 1.000 0.334 drs
14 0.945 1.000 0.945 drs
15 0.558 0.763 0.731 drs
16 0.607 0.669 0.907 drs
17 0.603 0.933 0.646 drs
18 0.780 0.880 0.886 drs
19 0.679 0.683 0.994 irs
20 0.612 0.613 1.000 –
21 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
22 0.900 1.000 0.900 drs
23 0.700 0.787 0.889 irs
24 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
25 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
26 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
27 1.000 1.000 1.000 –
28 1.000 1.000 1.000 –

mean 0.843 0.926 0.906

Note: crste = technical efficiency from CRS DEA
vrste = technical efficiency from VRS DEA
scale = scale efficiency = crste/vrste

Note also that all subsequent tables refer to VRS results

SUMMARY OF OUTPUT SLACKS:

firm output: 1 2 3 4
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 0.000 67.237 0.239 0.000
11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
12 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
15 0.000 0.000 0.124 0.114
16 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.006
17 1866678.112 0.000 0.014 0.000
18 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.043
19 0.000 0.000 0.309 0.000
20 0.000 0.000 0.260 0.025
21 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
23 212269.713 40.581 0.274 0.000
24 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
25 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
26 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
27 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
28 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

mean 74248.137 3.851 0.047 0.007

SUMMARY OF INPUT SLACKS:

firm input: 1 2 3 4
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 895.379 0.000 1346.654 0.000
11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
12 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
15 0.000 7346.479 0.000 0.000
16 105.536 0.000 0.000 0.000
17 0.000 128775.529 0.000 689695.043
18 347.415 0.000 0.000 0.000
19 45.989 0.000 0.000 0.000
20 0.000 0.000 251.616 0.000
21 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
23 0.000 0.000 49.264 0.000
24 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
25 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
26 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
27 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
28 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

mean 49.797 4861.500 58.841 24631.966

SUMMARY OF PEERS:

firm peers:
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 21 7 28 26
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 27 28 7 26 21
16 27 7 14 6 24
17 27 14 3 7
18 27 7 3 14 6
19 24 11 8 7 5 25
20 24 7 11 5 6
21 21
22 22
23 24 11 25 26
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28

SUMMARY OF PEER WEIGHTS:
(in same order as above)

firm peer weights:
1 1.000
2 1.000
3 1.000
4 1.000
5 1.000
6 1.000
7 1.000
8 1.000
9 1.000
10 0.034 0.046 0.202 0.717
11 1.000
12 1.000
13 1.000
14 1.000
15 0.008 0.433 0.040 0.346 0.172
16 0.312 0.155 0.397 0.116 0.020
17 0.149 0.076 0.079 0.696
18 0.337 0.075 0.106 0.417 0.065
19 0.014 0.362 0.124 0.109 0.114 0.276
20 0.393 0.418 0.051 0.092 0.046
21 1.000
22 1.000
23 0.265 0.435 0.021 0.280
24 1.000
25 1.000
26 1.000
27 1.000
28 1.000

PEER COUNT SUMMARY:
(i.e., no. times each firm is a peer for another)

firm peer count:
1 0
2 0
3 2
4 0
5 2
6 3
7 7
8 1
9 0
10 0
11 3
12 0
13 0
14 3
15 0
16 0
17 0
18 0
19 0
20

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