منبع تحقیق درمورد the، of، and، not

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objectives of dual containment regarding Iran even after the end of the period of Clinton’s presidency and ending of the dual containment policy. This indicates that the objectives of dual containment policy were not achieved, at least regarding to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The second axis of dual containment policy was Iraq. Since 1990, the Clinton administration had concluded that Saddam Hussein’s regime represents a direct and unacceptable threat to Washington’s regional and international interests. Therefore, the U.S. intensified its efforts to contain Iraq by 1) supporting different opposition groups, 2) covert operations to overthrow the Iraqi regime. In this regard, the Clinton administration spent USD$20 million yearly to achieve its goa1 (Weiner, 1996, p. 6), but clearly this strategy did not succeed.
Generally, The Clinton administration’s Dual Containment Policy objectives regarding Iraq were: 1) to prompt democratic forces to overthrow the Iraqi regime; 2) topple Saddam’s regime and replace it with a democratic regime (Wright & Broder, p. 3); 3) the topple of basic human right by the Saddam Hussein regime of the Iraqi Shiite and the Iraqi Kurds; 4) the challenges that the Iraqi regime posed to the regional security system and to the flow of oil supplies; 5) and the attempt to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction (Bahgat, 1997, p. 59).
As mentioned above, the Clinton administration had different objectives for Iran and Iraq. The common point for both countries was: “the regimes of both countries were viewed as dangerous because their policies were hostile to American interests” (Indyk, p. 2). But the difference was:
[…] Washington does not advocate the overthrow of the Islamic regime […] [but] administration leaders have espoused a more ambitious agenda for Iraq, [and] […] they view Saddam as incorrigible […] the administration does not seek or expect reconciliation with Saddam Hussein’s regime (Indyk, p. 2).
So the main objective and desire of the dual containment policy regarding Iraq was the overthrow of the Saddam regime, in essence, regime change. Even though the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein was overthrown by the American Forces, it was not as a result of the Dual Containment Policy but rather as the consequence of direct military presence of American forces and its allies against the Iraqi regime after the Clinton presidency and during the George W. Bush (junior) administration. During the Clinton presidency, Washington only relied on unsuccessful sanctions to overthrow the Iraqi regime.
4.6.1Evaluating the methods of containment
In general, since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, there were some policies to contain the export of Iran’s revolution and ideologies as an aggression to the Arab conservative neighbors and also preservation of interests of other countries in the world such as U.S. and western countries from Iranian aggression. A few of these methods of containment are: First, Sanctions (1979-2009) – since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 until the end of the George W. Bush (junior) administration in 2009, many sanctions against Iran were posed but most of them were unilateral with less support from the international community and the United Nations. All in all, US sanctions against Iran failed to overthrow the Iranian regime and could not contain Iran. Additionally, sanctions against Iran caused problems for reformers such as former president Mohammad Khatami to carry out their policies. The collapse of processing the reforms by Mohammad Khatami, led to failure of the reformists and victory for the hardliners in the next round of elections in 2005 in the hope of economic reforms by the new president (Ahmadinejad) who promised economic reforms.
Second, UN Sanctions (Present): Jeffrey Schott, a member of the “Peterson Institute” who drafted the early sanctions of the U.S. against Iran in the 1980’s argues that the UN sanctions would not stop Iran from building a nuclear weapon and at best, sanctions would only postpone for a few years the Iranian desire to have nuclear weapons (Schott, 2006). Schott also believes that the UN sanctions against Iraq’s WMD program were not successful because international support for sanctions against Iraq was simultaneous with the low oil prices of the 1990s. Even though the U.S. put pressure on its allies not to do business with Iran, need of western countries for Iran’s oil, created a dilemma for these countries.
Third: Use of non-state actors: After the Vietnam War and also during the Cold War, the U.S. did not want to use its military forces directly to contain the Soviet Union, so policymakers in Washington decided to support their allies, most of whom were far from liberal and democratic parameters and it was risky to long-term U.S. interests, especially in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region.
4.7 Evaluation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) policy
All the threats faced by GCC states are not produced by the external regimes such as Iran or Iraq, but some of these threats are raised within the political structure of power inside the Persian Gulf monarchy states. There are some domestic forces that challenge and destabilize monarchies and sheikhdoms inside these states. There are also some social and political similarities between the GCC states that distinguish them from other Arab countries, including oil-based economies, undemocratic political systems such as monarchies and sheikhdoms, small populations and territories, and especial cultural and religious traditions. As a result of these characteristics, political stability in the GCC Persian Gulf states is challenged by inherent structural limitations, rising expectations, and outside interferences (Joseph Albert Kechichian, p. 222).
According to what has been mentioned above, the following steps should be the first steps for independence of external powers:
a) Gradual domestic political and economic reform
Although there have been some established democratic symbols such as national assemblies or consultative councils in recent years in GCC states, the fact are that the real power belongs to the sheikhs and monarchies. The semi-parliamentary systems in Bahrain and Kuwait were dissolved at least once in the 70s, and the limitation of the legislative power of the UAE Federal National Council has made it an ineffective institution. Qatar has a constitutional monarchy that is ruled by families. Likewise Saudi Arabia and Oman are two other monarchy countries that do not have democratic institutions and are ruled by royal families.
It is a common characteristic that the ruling families in all GCC states control the political power. For example, the executive monopoly of the important positions, are held by members of the ruler’s family; in Bahrain it is 50 percent, in Kuwait it is 47 percent, in Oman it is 25 percent, in Qatar it is 45 percent, and in Saudi Arabia it is 46 percent of cabinet positions held by members of the ruler’s family (Joseph Albert Kechichian, p. 225).
We can conclude that the GCC states, like most Middle Eastern states, do not have popular legitimacy, are not democratic and most

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