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members is an act of aggression against all of its members. As defined in the 1930s, the meaning is “the safety of all by all.” Secondly, enforcement must have a degree of automaticity among the members of the collective security system. Members of the system must “be willing and able at all times to muster overwhelming strength for collective defense at successive points of conflict. A third element is some level of commitment to the status quo that is to say, the members of the system are states, and the vast majority (at least) of such states regard as sufficiently equitable their boundaries and other relationships (for example, trade), so that preponderant force can be mobilized to deter, or reverse, an act of aggression (Clark, 1995).
The fundamental structural principle of a Collective Security System can be illustrated with the axiom “one for all and all for one”. As a legal expression, this characterizes “Collective Security” as a system in which (1) nations commit themselves to the mutual and automatic securing of peace; (2) the protective function is independent of whether the aggressor is a member or not; and (3) the security system is never directed at a specific potential aggressor or aggressors. Common Security does not have “only” the long-term aim of replacing pacts and blocs as well as establishing a system of Collective Security (Lutz, 1984).
The model of collective security assumes that each member of international society be prepared to see an aggression anywhere as a threat to the peace and to view an attack on one as an attack on all. Peace, in other words, must be seen as indivisible. In addition, the model assumes that states are prepared to act decisively on this recognition even if such action is costly and goes against their more immediate short-term interests. Whether or not a state responded to a particular act of aggression would be determined by the overall pattern of its foreign policy interests (Hurrell, 1992).
Robert D. Murphy (1995) believes that Collective Security needs some implications as follows: First, Working partnerships; second, long-term basis – collective security policies are not designed to meet an emergency situation-. Third, Costs – we must accept the fact that our collective-security policies cost a great deal of money and probably will continue to be costly for a long period of years. Fourth, Requirements of leadership – the requirements of leadership are complex and strenuous, and the essential requirement is a profound understanding of the obligations of partnership. Fifth, not to destroy – the path of collective security involves many difficulties (Murphy, 1955).
Many scholars have criticized to collective security approach. Clark describes the principal criticisms of collective security as: 1) the very rebirth of enthusiasm for collective security leads to the suspicion that the conditions that make it now seem possible (peace – absence of a threat) will lead to its demise when inevitably the conditions change. 2) The universality and automaticity of the commitments of collective security will not be matched by members’ actions. 3) The timing of the response: Collective Security is likely to delay reaction to attack, because the members of the system must react, mobilize, and coordinate their response ad hoc. 4) The emphasis on multilateralism in the theory of collective security denigrates the value of unilateralism. 5) Because collective security envisions an automatic, multilateral response, such a response may actually turn minor wars into major ones (Clark, 1995).
Although the idea of collective security has had a curious history and we have been unable either to accept it or to acknowledge our abandonment of it. We reject and repudiate it in practice but persist in coddling it in theory. The advocacy for collective security remains strong and despite the problems with the theory of collective security, and, more specifically, the problems with the practice of peacekeeping, the U.S. continues to favor multilateral approaches to the problem of security.
2.3 Evolving of the Persian Gulf Security Regimes
During the 20th century, the Persian Gulf seems to have gone through at least three distinctly different security regimes, including Pax Britannica, Pax Saudi-Iranica, and Pax Americana. Pax Britannica lasted from 1918, the conclusion of World War I, to 1971, which marked the withdrawal of British forces from the East of the Suez (Tehranian, 2003).
The era of Pax Britannica came to an end with the postwar dismemberment of the British Empire and the rise of nationalist regimes in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine/Israel, and Egypt. A new era emerged in 1971 when the British forces were withdrawn from the East of the Suez. Under the circumstances, Pax Americana could have effectively replaced Pax Britannica. However, the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam had led to the emergence of the Nixon Doctrine calling for the establishment of proxy powers in various regions of the world to act on behalf of the United States’ interests. In the Persian Gulf, the monarchist regimes of Saudi Arabia and Iran presented themselves as candidates for this role (Tehranian, 2003)
In the 1970s, the Nixon-Kissinger’s Doctrine transformed the Shah’s status from that of a protected client to that of a regional partner of the United States. Washington’s geopolitical design – related to the Nixon -Kissinger Doctrine – created a new constellation of pro-American powers in the Middle East and Southern Africa (Falk, 1979). Falk posits that there were three principal reasons for this shift. First, Soviet influence was perceived to be expanding in the area which contains the world’s largest and most accessible mineral and oil resources. Secondly, the national liberation movements, whose success was presumed to be inimical to western interests, were seen as gaining momentum. Thirdly, revitalization of American power in this region was needed to neutralize the growing American economic failure to maintain its competitive position in the world system vis-a-vis either Japan or Western Europe (1979; 45).
Marz (1997) agrees with the first reason and adds two other different reasons for Dual Containment: “A second determining factor is the political outcome of Desert Storm. Although the war was a clear military victory for the coalition forces, its political aftermath is considered a failure by many observers because Saddam Hussein remains in power. The third factor was the Arab-Israeli peace process. Both Iran and Iraq have well-documented ties to subversive elements that are opposed to the peace process” (M. J. L. Mraz, 1997).
The Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran brought Pax Saudi-Iranica to an end and then with the support of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, as well as Western powers, Iraq invaded Iran in 1980. The consequence was an eight-year war in which both sides incurred incalculable material and human costs (Tehranian, 5). After the brokered ceasefire between Iran and Iraq in 1988, a third period thus began under the aegis of Pax Americana and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990 ensured direct US intervention in Persian Gulf conflicts. In this period and after victory of the coalition, Dual Containment was the most important approach that was held by U.S. in the Persian Gulf region.
On May 18, 1993, in a speech delivered to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Martin Indyk, outlined the basic tenets of the policy of Dual Containment. He stated that the United States would no longer play the game of balancing Iran against Iraq. The strength of the United States and its friends in the region would allow Washington to “counter both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes. We will not need to depend on one to counter the other” (The-Washington-Institute-for-Near-East-Policy, 1993). The Clinton administration had crafted a policy which sought to deal with these threats by isolating both countries regionally, cutting them off from the world economic and trading system, and encouraging a regime change in Iraq (Gause, 1994). The basic strategic principle involved was the containment of both of these nations in a way that facilitated the protection of critical American interests, the security of US allies and the free flow of oil at stable prices (Lake, 1994a).
Lake defines the core values as: (1) pursuit of democratic (2) expansion of free markets; (3) peaceful settlement of conflict, and (4) promotion of collective security. Lake had believed that “Dual Containment cannot be accomplished by the United States alone; however, it requires the assistance of regional allies, especially the GCC nations” (M. J. L. Mraz, 1997).
Anthony Lake brought five specific charges against Iran while calling it a backlash state: (a) Iran is actively engaged in clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear and other unconventional weapons and long-range missile-delivery systems; (b) it is the foremost sponsor of terrorism and assassination worldwide; (c) it is violently opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process; (d) it seeks to subvert friendly Governments across the Middle East and in parts of Africa; and (e) it is attempting to acquire offensive conventional capabilities to threaten its neighbors (Dietl, 1995).
A number of unique circumstances that have allowed the Clinton administration to pursue this course of action were : 1) First, the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union eliminated a major barrier in any consideration of US policy in the Persian gulf; 2) Second, a regional balance of power that has been established between Iran and Iraq; 3) Third, as a result of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf Cooperation Council states were somewhat less reluctant than they previously were to enter into security arrangements with the US; 4) Fourth, the Clinton administration felt that the broad strategic context in the Middle East was helping to reinforce the

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